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(ii) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court should find that there remain in dispute genuine 
issues of material fact regarding Fred M. Rosenthal's 
("Rosenthal") liability for indemnification to Zions such that 
the September 9, 1985 Order of Summary Judgment ought to be 
either vacated or amended to show that its finality is 
contingent upon the finality of the Zions Order dated July 5, 
1985. The responsive arguments raised by Rosenthal are 
improperly raised in this appeal because Rosenthal did not 
argue them to the Court below. Although, his arguments were 
raised in another proceeding on a motion to dismiss which has 
not been appealed, that proceeding is unrelated to the instant 
appeal. Moreover, the arguments raised in the unrelated motion 
to dismiss were unpersuasive at that time, and the motion was 
consequentially denied. 
ARGUMENT 
ROSENTHAL'S RESPONSIVE ARGUMENTS ARE IMPROPERLY RAISED 
IN THIS APPEAL IN THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT IN THE CORRESPONDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROCEEDING BELOW, AND WERE DENIED AS PREVAILING 
ARGUMENTS IN A PRIOR MOTION TO DISMISS, WHICH DENIAL 
IS NOW PRECEDENTIAL IN THIS APPEAL. 
The issues presented in this appeal are whether there 
remain in dispute genuine issues of material fact regarding 
Rosenthal's culpability and whether the motion made below, if 
found to have been properly granted, was properly consummated 
in the order with regards to its finality and form. The record 
shows that it was entered with prejudice and not contingent 
upon any other motion or proceeding; therefore, the Order 
excludes its dismissal from being related to the Zions Order, 
(See Exhibit A-7 attached to Appellant's Brief.) 
A• Rosenthal Improperly Raises New Issues in This Appeal. 
It is difficult to understand the arguments raised by 
Rosenthal in his Respondent's Brief. Rather, Rosenthal's Brief 
is conclusory in nature and fails to establish facts of law 
which oppose those raised in Zions' Brief. It appears as 
though Rosenthal is arguing that Zions' claim regarding 
Rosenthal's negligence is either improperly brought or easily 
defended on the ground that any alleged damaging acts were 
caused by Zions* independent intervening acts sufficiently 
forceful to break any chain of causation involving Rosenthal. 
Brief of Respondent at 5-11. However, Rosenthal never raised 
this issue in his motion for partial summary judgment below. 
(See Rosenthal's Memorandum in Support of Rosenthal Motion For 
Summary Judgment, a copy of which is attached hereto as Reply 
Exhibit 1.) 
- 2 -
It is clear that for a question to be considered on appeal, 
the record must reflect that such issue was presented to the 
trial court in a timely manner sufficient to obtain a ruling 
thereon. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). Applying this principle to the 
case at hand, it appears as though the issues regarding 
Rosenthal's negligence, as compared to the claims made by 
plaintiffs against Zions regarding Zions' intentional 
misrepresentation and fraud, may not properly be raised for the 
first time in this appeal. 
B. Denial of Rosenthal's Unrelated Motion to Dismiss is 
Precedential in this Appeal. 
For an even greater reason, the arguments now raised by 
Rosenthal were previously raised in a motion to dismiss 
unrelated to the instant appeal, but a part of this entire 
civil matter. On January 26, 1984 Rosenthal filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Zions1 Third Party Complaint on the grounds that the 
Third Party Complaint failed to state a claim against Rosenthal 
upon which relief could be granted. (See R. at 722-724, a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Reply Exhibit-2.) 
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In his Memorandum submitted in support of the January 26, 
1984 motion, Rosenthal set forth two questions raised therein: 
1. Can ZION's [sic] found its complaint in 
negligence after Judge Hal Taylor's Order 
approving ratifying the acts of and 
discharging ZIONS as Personal Representative? 
2. Can the injury suffered by Plaintiff 
from ZIONS alleged intentional 
misrepresentations be proximately the result 
of ROSENTHAL'S alleged negligence? 
R. at 713-721. (See Reply Exhibit-3 attached hereto.) 
During oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, Rosenthal 
argued that Zions' Third Party Complaint alleged negligence, 
and that even if the negligence claim were not barred, it must 
fail for lack of proximate cause. R. at 8. Rosenthal stated 
that M[a]cts, if any, attributable to ROSENTHAL are instruments 
of superior or controlling principal. Certainly no 
relationship exists between ROSENTHAL'S conduct and harm to 
Plaintiff." R. at 720. 
After hearing arguments on the motion, Judge Sawaya signed 
an Order dated April 9, 1984 which states: 
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The said Third Party Complaint, although 
defensible, does state causes of action 
which require response by the third party 
defendants and accordingly, the motions to 
dismiss are denied . . . 
R. at 906-910. (See Reply Exhibit-4 attached hereto.) 
Rosenthal now argues in his Respondent's Brief that he was 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter law for the reason 
that Zions failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action against him, based on the arguments raised in 
his motion to dismiss. (Brief of Respondent at 5-11.) 
Inasmuch as the Court denied his January 26, 1984 motion, it is 
the precedential law of the instant appeal that substantive 
issues do remain on Zions1 claims against Rosenthal. 
Consequently, the arguments raised by Zions in this appeal are 
more persuasive in leading this Court to a correct resolution 
in its favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the record in this case and the argument presented 
by Zions and Rosenthal, it is apparent that there remain in 
dispute genuine issues of material fact regarding Rosenthal's 
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liability for indemnification to Zions for his responsibility 
for the dissipation of the Pepper estate assets. As a result, 
Zions respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
September 9, 1985 Order of summary judgment entered by the 
district court. That order can be either vacated or amended to 
provide that its finality is contingent upon the finality of 
the Zions Order. In either manner, Zions' claim for 
indemnification against Rosenthal is preserved in the event the 
Zions Order is reversed on appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
GARY R. HOWE 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
SHERYL L. SIMPSON 
By > W W ^ 
SherylQ^. Simpson 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Plaintiffs-Appellant, Zions 
First National Bank 
CDN2799S 
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REPLY EXHIBIT-1 
MM 11 4 5*PH'85 
BERNARD L. ROSE 
Attorney for Third P\rty Defendant, 
32 Exchange Place, Siiite.- 404 
Salt Lake City, Utah mill 
Telephone: (801) 355-^888 
g LERK \ 
Ts^rrthal . . ~CtzIuC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona 
resident; PI- \\ . , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
N.A.; et al., 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
N A. ; et al., 
T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f s , 
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, an Arizona 
r e s i d e n t ; e t a l , 
T h i r d - P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s . 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ROSENTHAL MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. C-82-2779 
JAMES F. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
Zions and Rosenthal entered into a Stipulation dated 22 
April I »H4 whoi -'in it w.v.. stated "Zion1^ complaint does 
not and shall not be construed as alleging any claim against 
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Plaintiffs1 Complaint, and renounces liability in Rosenthal 
for punitive damages relating to the said third and fourth." 
Since Plaintiff's First Cause is "umbrella" and fifth 
cause contingent, emphasis is placed on such relief as the 
court may grant relative to the Plaintiffs1 second cause of 
action. 
FACTS 
1. Zions Third Party Complaint, paragraphs 14, 17, and 
23, alleges Third Party Defendants, including Rosenthal, 
were involved as management personnel or accountant of 
Allied Steel Company, Peppers Allied Metals Co., Peppers 
Allied Steel Company, and Learner Pepper Company. Paragraph 
17, " . . . in the course of responsibilities of employment 
they (including Rosenthal) made representations of material 
fact. . . . " 
2. Paragraphs 22 and 23 allege Third Party Defendant 
responsibility, including Rosenthal, to be due to failure to 
exercise reasonable care, in failure to discover or disclose 
facts. 
3. Paragraph 25 alleges it was reasonably foreseeable 
Third Party Defendants would exercise reasonable care in the 
performance of their duties. 
4. Rosenthal alleges his employment with Pamco ceased 
on or about December 23, 1980, and Zions agrees. (Response 
to Rosenthal Interrogatory #1.) 
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5 . In r e s p o n s e to I n t e r r o g a t o r y 4 , r e q u e s t i n g f a c t u a l 
s p e c i f i c s of R o s e n t ha ] ! 5 pa 1:t L c i p a t i on in t h e a c t i v i t i e s of 
Pamco a f t e r December 2 3 , 1 9 8 0 , and s t a t e m e n t of f a c t s for 
which Z i o n ' s s e e k s r e c o v e r y of damaqes from Rosen tha l , fo r 
h i s a c t s r e l a t i n g t o Pamco a f t e r November 30, 1980, Z ions 
r e s p o n s e was " Z i o n ' s i s not aware of * o f f i c i a l a c t i v i t i e s 
in wh i nl: 1 R o s e n t h ; • olvpfi nn *»na_: of Pamco a f t e r • 
December 2 3 , 19 8 0 . However, Zio b e l i e v e s t h a t R o s e n t h a l 
had c o n t i n u i n g i n : 
o f f i c e r s , and employees a f t e r t h a t d a t e , " 
6. As t o damages a g a i n s t R o s e n t h a l , - : a o n : 
g e n e r a 11 y" h t,11H L I, * \ 11 a t t empt to r e c o v e r from R o s e n t h a l 
such r e c o v e r y which are r e c o v e r e d from Zions by P l a i n t i f f s , 
wh i ch a r e j ro tin de d 1 ip :> r 1 ac t i o n s of Ro s en 11 1 a 1 i mput ed to 
Zions i n law or i n fac t .™ 
7 '"Zions has not y e t comple ted di 51 ov^ry Irmii 
P l a i n t i f t and t h e r e f o r e cannot s t a t e c l a i m s a g a i n s t 
R o s e n t h a l for h i s a c t s or o m i s s i o n s . " 
8 . R e s p o n s e 1 1 > I n t e r r o g a t .ory #5 " . . . - - - ^ r e s p e c t to 
a s s e t s of t h e r e s p e c t i v e t r u s t s , Zions b e l i e v e s R o s e n t h a l 
d i d no t have any i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h a s s e t s which wen* s o l e l y 
1; inder the c o n t r o l of t h e t r u s t ,. However, !", 
9. I c a n n o t f i n d i n the remainder of f o r t y pages of 
I n t e r r o g a t or i e s arm I r e s p o n s e s , any words f o r t h r i g h t l y 
r e s p o n s i v e which r e s o l v e the q u e s t i o n s of R o s e n t h a l ' s 
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implication in the allegations of the Plaintiffs1 second 
cause of action, 
10. I ask the court as a matter of law, to give 
judgment on, or limine relief on, or strike on behalf of 
Rosenthal, such issues of fact which are irrelevant to Fred 
Rosenthal as measured by his negligence, particularly if 
negligence is the measure of Rosenthal's culpability. 
ARGUMENT 
Principal Plaintiffs1 second cause starts with 
paragraph 70 of Complaint. 
Paragraphs 70 through 74 create no culpability in 
Rosenthal occurring after December 1980. 
Paragraph 75 alleges Zions represented to Plaintiffs 
that the sale of the interest in Lerner Pepper was to 
benefit beneficiaries, when in fact it was to protect Zion's 
line of credit in sum of $930,000. 
Paragraphs 76 through 81 all relate to the sale of 
these assets and the distribution of the major portion of 
the receipts to Zions. 
Paragraph 82 alleges distribution of approximately 
$220,000 to Kennecott to pay a debt of an insolvent 
corporation (Pamco). There is no allegation either here or 
in the third party complaint, that these acts so far 
complained of were prior to Rosenthal's leaving Pamco in 
-12-
December 1980, or that he was In a decision making role in 
the execution of these acts "Tt>;ji i:,i.:t, i, ,\ the preceding 
related incidents occurred after December 31, 1980. 
Paragraph 84 is an umbrella paragraph of alphabetical 
denoni na t io n f r c>m (.3 I tfi i: ouqh I k ) only one of which of 
Rosenthal's involvement may be an issue; i.e. subparagraph 
(k). 
WHEREFORE, Third Party Defendant, Fred Rosenthal, prays 
for judgment on, or limine relief on, or strike nn behalf 
of Rosenthal, such issues of fact which are irrelevant to 
Fred Rosenthal as measured by his negligence, particularly 
if negligence is the measure of Rosenthal s culpability. 
DATED this / 3 day Qt-JJay, 1985. 
^ > 
BERNARD L. ROSE 
Attorney for Rosenthal 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / ? ^ day of May, 1985, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum in Support of Rosenthal Motion for Summary 
Judgment, postage prepaid, to: 
H. Michael Keller, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
P.O. Box 3400 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
H. Russell Hettinger, Esq. 
GREEN, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
Suite 800, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Edward S. Sweeney, Esq. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John S. ChLndlund, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GLEDZARLER 
425 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard D. Parry, Esq. 
Ross C. Anderson, Esq. 
BERMAN & ANDERSON 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 178 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Donald C. Hughes, Esq. 
2411 Keisel'::^e4iue, No. 104 
Ogden, Utah -&£§£ 
REPLY EXHIBIT-2 
BERNARD L. ROSE 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Fred M. Rosenthal 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona 
resident; et. al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N.A., et. al., 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
) 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. C82-2779 
* * * • * A * 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N.A , 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada 
resident; WILLIAM RONALD 
PEPPER, a Wyoming resident; 
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, an Arizona 
resident; CHARLES H. FOOT, a 
Utah resident; and FRANK C. 
NIELSEN, J.,WILL LEWIS, RAY 
0. WESTERGARD, ROGER BROWN 
and PHILLIP E. OSBORNE d/b/a 
FOX & COMPANY, and MAIN 
HURDMAN, a Utah Corporation, 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW Defendant, FRED tU ROSENTHAL, for himself, by his 
attorney, BERNARD L. ROSE, and moves this Court pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Third Party 
Plaintiff's Complaint herein on file on the ground that said Third 
Party Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against Third 
Party Defendant upon which relief can be granted, and for 
attorney's fees in the sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($3,500.00) . 
This Motion is based on Third Party Plaintiff's Complaint 
and Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Rosenthal's Affidavit 
and Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of 
Motion to Dismiss. -^__ 
eta, 
DATED this ^ £ ; day of January, 1984. 
^ 
^-^_~^SS^. 
Bernard L. Rose 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Fred M. Rosenthal 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum 
Supporting Fred Rosenthal's Motion to Dismiss Zions' Third Party 
Complaint to: 
H. Russell Hettinger 
Greene, Callister & Nebeker 
Suite 800, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Mike Keller 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwa.ll & McCarthy 
P.O. Box 3400 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
2411 Keiel Avenue, #104 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Edward S. Sweeney 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John S. Chindlund 
Prince, Yeates & Geld2ahler 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Main Hurdman 
Suite #460, Kennecott Buildina 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
this ^(c^ day of January, 1984. 
// 
MVUM^r -, ^ U*~^ 
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REPLY EXHIBIT-3 
BERNARD L. ROSE 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Fred M. Rosenthal 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Teleohone: (801) 532-2666 
FH ED III CIEP<S OFFICE 
SALT LA* SCCUM PMJTArf 
fa! fflwIHW 
H. OIXOH HIHCLEY CLERf 
DC-IT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona 
resident; et. al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
tf.A., et. al. , 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
******* 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
S.A., et. al., 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada 
resident; WILLIAM RONALD 
PEPPER, a Wyoming resident; 
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, an Arizona 
resident; CHARLES H. FOOT, a 
Jtah resident; and FRANK C. 
NIELSEN, J. WILL LEWIS, RAY 
D. WESTERGARD, ROGER BROWN 
and PHILLIP E. OSBORNE d/b/a 
FOX & COMPANY, and MAIN 
iURDMAN, a Utah Corporation, 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
FRED ROSENTHAL'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
ZIONS' THIRD AMENDED 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C82-2779 
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STATEMENT. OF FACTS 
1. About February 17, 1976 on ZIONS Petitions, JUDGE JA24ES 
SAWAYA Ordered: 
(a) ZIONS appointment as Executor of the Estate of 
JEROME B. PEPPER, who died January 9, 1976, 
(fa) Continuance ot operation of specific steel 
operations, and 
(c) "authorized HIP appointment by ZIONS nf FRED M. 
ROSENTHAL to represent ZIONS as Executor in the opera-
tion" of each as General Manager (Probate Fi le #62736). 
AUiui" April ly, I"i76r ZIONS acquired to itself all* 
contingent interests and rights to the income and equities of the 
PEPPER Estate and Trusts by various .ucutrily instruments; and 
thereafter, as Trustee of PEPPER INTERVIVOS TRUSTS guaranteed an 
$800,000.00 line of credit by ZIONS BANK to PASCO and PAMCO two 
(2) on the metals operations. Thereafter, ZIONS through PAMCO, 
nade loans which were expended by ZIONS for purposes ultra vires of 
PAMCO, not for PAMCO ' s 1 eg 11imate pur; •' njses I Paragraphs 23-39 , 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint). 
December 23, 1980, ROSENTHAL severed connection with 
ZION- :• :.?! ^  Interest s (Unrefuted Affidavit filed with prior 
Motion to Dismiss). 
4. On October 8f 1981, .JUDGE HAL TM'LOR Ordered: 
(a) Approval of First and Final Account; 
(b) Ratified and approved all arts of ZTONS as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of JEROME B. PEPPER includ-
ing distribution to itself, on May 28th, 1981 as Trustee,of 
the PEPPER interest in the LEARNER-PEPPER co-venture, 
which Trustee sold on May 28th, 1981 for $1,000,000.00 
(Paragraphs 43, 47, 48 Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Com-
plaint) . 
5. FANNIE N. PEPPER received directly or out of probate, 
less than $70,000.00 from all asset entities, whereas, (Paragraph 
39) ZIONS, on March 31, 1981, as Personal Representative represent-
ed the net worths of PAMCO, LEARNER-PEPPER, the Estates of JEROME 
3. PEPPER and FANNIE N. PEPPER to be in the periods between 
December 31, 1979 and July 31, 1980 to be $597,653.00; $3,544,297.00 
and $2,555,248.00. 
6. As to First Cause of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended 
Complaint (Paragraph 56), on information and belief, accountants 
and ROSENTHAL knew, and reported the true value of PEPPER ESTATE 
assets to ZIONS, which continued to represent to Plaintiffs estate 
values which ZIONS knew to be untrue. Loss resulted from this 
intentional misrepresentation made with intent, that Plaintiffs 
rely thereon, and Plaintiffs did to their injury (Paragraph 58). 
ZIONS charged trustees fees and professional fees in the 
operation and liquidation of PAMCO, based on false values it 
represented to Plaintiff (Paragraph 56). 
7. As to Second Cause of Action, ZIONS, as Personal Repre-
sentative, transferred the PEPPER interest in LEARNER-PEPPER to 
itself as Trustee and as such, sold this interest with a true 
purpose to protect ZIONS by paying its improvidently incurred 
line of credit of approximately $930,000.00. The date of transfer 
and sale (Paragraph 43) was on or about May 28, 1981. ROSENTHAL 
on December 23, 1980 severed all connections with the Estate. 
8. As to Third Cause of Action, ZIONS as Trustee of FANNIE 
N. PEPPER INTERVIVOS TRUST, breached its fiduciary relationship 
as it relates to its purchase municipal bonds and excessive 
charges of fees for funds flowing from foreign sources through 
the said Trust. 
9. The Fourth Cause of Action alleges that as Trustee, 
ZIONS failed its fiduciary relationship with the JEROME B. PfiPPER 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST by not keeping trust corpus derived from 
insurance policies separate from estate assets and used money for 
purposes not intended by PEPPER. 
10. The Fifth Cause of Action recounts the sins of ZIONS 
for the purpose of claiming punitive damages. 
11. ZIONS THIRD AMENDED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT alleges on 
information and belief, the Third Party Defendants in their 
capacities as employees, agents, shareholders, directors, officers 
of ALLIED STEEL COMPANY, PEPPERS ALLIED METALS, PEPPERS ALLIED 
STEEL, and LEARNER-PEPPER were negligent in their duties and re-
sponsibilities for said companies and breached their contracts by 
failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of their 
duties, failed to discover and/or disclose facts with regard to 
the financial condition of the comoanies. 
12. Paragraph 10 states ZIONS is Defendant who may be 
lamaged to extent of recovery by Plaintiffs and on information 
ind belief, ZIONS is entitled to recover against all Third Party 
defendants to the extent of judgment on the ground that the 
legligence and breaches of contract were the proximate cause of 
±e damage which original Plaintiffs may have suffered. 
ARGUMENT 
Two (2) major questions are raised by ZIONS Complaint against 
IOSENTHAL: 
1 • Can ZION's found its complaint in negligence after Judge 
lal Taylor's Order approving, ratifying the acts of, and discharg-
.ng ZIONS as Personal Representative? 
2. Can the injury suffered by Plaintiff from ZIONS alleged 
.ntentional misrepresentations be proximately the result of 
IOSENTHAL's alleged negligence? 
ZIONS received from Judge David Dee the Answer to the First 
juestion when he sustained ZION'S objection to Plaintiffs1 
)riginal Complaint founded in negligence. Judge Dee found negli-
gence is precluded as a vehicle for collateral attack on a decree 
ipproving, ratifying and discharging. 
In argument therein, was cited Auerbach vs. Samuels 10 (2) 
.52; 349 P(2) 1112, as follows: 
The difficulty confronting plaintiffs is the binding 
effect with which such orders and decrees are endowed. 
At this late date, they could pierce the protective 
armor of the decree referred to above and successfully 
-22-
•717 
assert an interest in the estate only by showing 
that they have been victims of fraud; and this 
would have to be a kind known as extrinsic 
fraud. 
Extrinsic fraud is to be distinguished from 
ordinary garden variety fraud. The latter... 
is that which occurs in the framework of the 
actual conduct of the trial .... The respon-
sibility rests upon those conducting the 
trial to expose and deal with any such 
deception.... 
On the other hand,extrinsic fraud, with which 
we are here concerned, is of a different char-
acter. It is sometimes referred to as collateral 
fraud because it is the type of fraud which 
would justify setting aside a decree or judg-
ment on collateral attack. The characteristic 
peculiar to extrinsic fraud is that it relates 
... to happenings outside the actual trial... 
so there is thus prevented any real contested 
issues which would have been presented and 
tried expect for the fraud. Accord In Re; 
Raleigh Estate, supra, Moyes v. Agree, 
supra, In Re; Rices1 Estate, supra. 
As to the second question, assuming proximate cause is 
determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of 
logic, common sense, policy and precedent (Pease vs. Sinclair 
Refining 104 F(2) 183; 123 ALR 933), it follows that the Court 
must find, as a matter of law, ROSENTHAL to be the agent of 
Personal Representative ZIONS, which hired ROSENTHAL as its 
representative and which as early as within three (3) months of 
the death of JEROME PEPPER was fully aware of the affairs of the 
companies, having guaranteed as Trustee an increase in credit to 
the iron companies. 
Second, parameters of ROSENTHAL'S employment must be kept in 
mind. 
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a. Scope of Authority, He had none beyond the orbit 
of the metals companies* 
b. Limit of Authority, He represented the Executor as 
General Manager of business operations. He was subordin-
ate in authority in terms of operating statements, 
balance sheets and audits and policy, 
c. ROSENTHAL had neither authority nor duty to the 
trusts or trustee and no responsibility to either. 
d. ROSENTHAL had no responsibility to anything PEPPER 
after December 23, 1980, his date of termination. 
(Unrefuted Affidavit filed with previous Motion to 
Dismiss.> 
e. . According to PlaintiffsfComplaint, ROSENTHAL told 
the truth, while ZIONS did not. 
f. ROSENTHAL did not participate in (1) escalating credit 
to $930,000.00 in February, 1981 or (2) transferring 
LEARNER-PEPPER and OGDEN YARD assets to ZIONS as Trustee, 
or in their sale for One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) 
and Eighty Eight Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Two Dollars 
($88,352.00) respectively, on or about May 28, 1981 and 
use this trust cash to pay bankrupt corporate debts of 
$249,000.00 with the remainder to itself as a bank to 
reduce the credit line. 
His authority was limited to his agency subject to the 
supervision and audit of his principal, ZIONS, and Co-Third 
M?1 O 
Party Defendants, the accountants. 
ZIONS on or about September 23, 1981, filed for and received 
from JUDGE HAL TAYLOR approval of First and Final Account, Final 
Settlement, Ratification and Approval of Acts, 
The Third Party Complaint alleges essentially only negli-
gence. Assuming such an action is not barred as against ROSENTHAL 
by Decision in Samuels vs. Auerbajch, 10 Utah (2) 152; 349 P(2) 
1112, then this action against ROSENTHAL must fail for lack of 
proximate cause. Acts, if any, attributable to ROSENTHAL are 
instruments of a superior or controlling principal. Certainly no 
relationship exists between ROSENTHAL'S conduct and harm to 
Plaintiff. 
Nor,_ if ROSENTHAL is negligent in any respect, can the Court 
fail, as a matter law, first to ignore the contributory negligence 
of ZIONS or its hired agents other than ROSENTHAL in failing to 
discover ROSENTHAL errors, or second, the injurious acts inflicted 
on Plaintiffs (PEPPER) by ZIONS as a Trustee intervening between 
ROSENTHAL'S acts and PLAINTIFF'S injury. 
It is incongruous that ZIONS having plucked plenteous fruits 
from the orchards of an unwitting owner, who now demands their 
return, should not be estopped from requiring apples as recoupment 
from a subordinate, controlled agent who never even got near the 
tree. 
ZION's action against ROSENTHAL obscures the fact situation 
that the other Third Party Defendants were more broadly involved 
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with ZIONS than ROSENTHAL, not only in the time frame of activity 
but also by involvement with the trusts as accountants and bene-
ficiaries. 
ZIONS action against FRED ROSENTHAL is without merit, not in 
good faith, calculated to harass him by serving him as a party and 
thereby subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, rather than as 
a witness whose nonresidence creates the hazard of appearance as 
well as the issue of his being a friendly or hostile witness. 
ROSENTHAL is thereby entitled to reasonable attorneys fees 
and a reasonable sum of such is Three Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($3,500.00) pursuant to Section 78-27-56 UCA (1973). • 
WHEREFORE, ROSENTHAL moves this Court that it dismiss the 
Complaint of ZIONS and this cause against FRED ROSENTHAL with 
prejudice, and 
2. Award to him for the use and benefit of his attorney the 
sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500,00) . 
DATED this— o Hay of January, 1984. 
Attorney for Third P^rt^M&e#«iaant, 
Fred Rosenthal 
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REPLY EXHIBIT-4 ;-v 
3REENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
J. THOMAS GREENE 
4ARK O. VAN WAGONER 
i. RUSSELL HETTINGER 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
3alt Lake City, Utah 84133 
relephone: (801) 531-7676 
attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
>H1LL1P C. PEPPER, an Arizona 
r e s i d e n t ; e t a l . , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs, 
510NS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
4.A. ; et al. , 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS 
OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS 
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, CHARLES 
H. FOOTE, FOX & COMPANY 
AND MAIN-HURDMAN TO DISMISS 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C82-2779 
* * * * * 
5 IONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
J.A. ; et al. , 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEWART A. PEPPER, a Nevada 
r e s i d e n t ; e t ' a l . , 
T h i r d - P a r t y 
Defendan t s . 
* * * * * * * 
On February 28, 1984, the following motions came on 
regularly for hearing before the Court, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Court Judge, presiding: 
1. Motion to Dismiss, dated January 26, 1984 (on behalf 
on Fred M. Rosenthal); 
2. Motion of Third Party Defendants Charles H. Foote and 
Fox h» Company to Dismiss Third Amended Third Party Complaint, 
dated February 16, 1984; 
3. Motion of Charles E. Johnson to Dismiss the Third 
Party Complaint for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief 
Can be Granted and for Failure to Join Indispensible Parties, 
dated February 16, 1984 (filed on behalf of Charles E. Johnson 
dba riain-Hurdman) . 
The movant third party defendants entered appearances as 
follows: Bernard L. Rose appeared on behalf of Fred M. 
Rosenthal; Ross C. Anderson and Richard D. Parry appeared on 
behalf of Main-Hurdman; and H. Michael Keller appeared on 
behalf of Charles H. Foote and Fox & Company. J. Thomas Groone 
and H. Russell Hettinger appeared on behalf of third party 
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plaintiff Zions First National Bank. The Court having heard 
the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the supporting 
memoranda filed by all parties, and having taken the matter 
under advisement to consider the arguments of counsel and the 
written memoranda, and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDKKED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Third Party 
Complaint dated December 16, 1984, although defensible, does 
state causes of action which require response by the third 
party defendants and accordingly, the third party defendants; 
motions to dismiss are denied and third party defendants are 
granted 15 days from March 23, 1984 in which to file an answer 
to said Third Party Complaint. 
ril / » DATED: Ap , 1984. 
BY THE COURT 
lo rab le James S. Sawaya 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
GCN1118H A T T E S T 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clark 
}6puty Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTIONS OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS FRED 
M. ROSENTHAL, CHARLES H. FOOTE, FOX & COMPANY AND MAIN-HURDMAN 
TO DISMISS THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT was hand delivered, this 30th 
day of March, 1984, to the following: 
Leonard J. Lewis 
H. Michael Keller 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Charles H. Foote and fox & Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Irving H. Biele 
Roy G. Haslam 
Edward S. Sweeney 
BIELE. HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Bernard L. Rose 
Attorney for Fred M. Rosenthal 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John S. Chindlund 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Stewart Pepper 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Ross C. Anderson 
Richard D. Parry 
BERMAN & ANDERSON 
P.O. BOX 1781 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. (mailed, postage prepaid) 
Attorney for William Ronald Pepper 
2411 Kiesel Avenue #104 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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